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Safety	 assessment	 in	 primary	 Mycobacterium	
tuberculosis	 smear	 microscopy	 centres	 in	 Blantyre	
Malawi:	a	facility	based	cross	sectional	survey
	 	 	 ABSTRACT
Introduction
Tuberculosis (TB) is caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis and is 
transmitted mainly through aerosolization of  infected sputum which 
puts laboratory workers at risk in spite of  the laboratory workers’ risk of  
infection being at 3 to 9 times higher than the general public. Laboratory 
safety should therefore be prioritized and optimized to provide sufficient 
safety to laboratory workers.
Objective
To assess the safety for the laboratory workers in TB primary microscopy 
centres in Blantyre urban.
Methodology
TB primary microscopy centers in Blantyre urban were assessed in 
aspects of  equipment availability, facility layout, and work practice, using 
a standardized WHO/AFRO ISO 15189 checklist for the developing 
countries which sets the minimum safety score at ≥80%. Each center was 
graded according to the score it earned upon assessment.
Results
Only one (1) microscopy center out nine (9) reached the minimum safety 
requirement. Four (4) centers were awarded 1 star level, four (4) centers 
were awarded 2 star level and only one (1) center was awarded 3 star level.
Conclusion
In Blantyre urban, 89% of  the Tuberculosis microscopy centers are failing 
to provide the minimum safety to the laboratory workers. Government 
and other stake holders should be committed in addressing the safety 
challenges of  TB microscopy centres in the country to ensure safety for 
the laboratory workers.
Recommendations
It is recommended that the study be conducted at the regional or national 
level for both public and private laboratories in order to have a general 
picture of  safety in Tb microscopy centres possibly across the country. 
Introduction	And	Background
Tuberculosis (TB) is caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
(M.Tb). This disease is a major global health problem. Each 
year, there are around 9 million new cases of  TB and close 
to 2 million people die from the disease and all countries 
are affected but 85% of  cases occur in Africa (30%) and 
Asia(55%) while India and China alone represent 35%1.
TB cases in Malawi have recently gone downward, 
decreasing from nearly 28,000 notified cases in 2003 to 
about 23,000 notified cases in 2010. In 2007, Malawi 
declared TB a national emergency2. This means that TB 
still remains a health problem in Malawi despite the notable 
efforts and strategies put in place in the previous years to 
combat the disease by National Tuberculosis Program 
(NTP). Since TB is chiefly spread through inhalation of  
droplet particles (nuclei) containing virulent human strains 
of  “Mycobacterium tuberculosis” in crowded places or 
rooms with limited air flow; prisons, hospitals and any large 
gathering for a prolonged time, this overcrowding poses a 
risk of  transmitting the bacilli3. In a hospital setting, this 
leaves clinicians, nurses, ward attendants, laboratory workers 
and other health workers at risk of  Tuberculosis infection. 
“Health care workers and other staff  are also at particularly 
high risk of  infection with TB because of  frequent exposure 
to patients with infectious TB disease”4
Another study conducted in Malawi in 1998 found that 
Laboratory conditions and safety procedures were poor. 
In the findings, out of  38 hospitals in the sample frame, 17 
(45%) had an area of  less than 25 m2, eight (21%) had a 
separate room for tuberculosis work, and five (13%) had 
a safety cabinet. All laboratory personnel wore gloves, but 
in several hospitals there were no white coats, face masks, 
protective aprons or soap for washing hands5. As such, it is 
crucial to determine how safe the Laboratories are for the 
workers therein if  we are also going to scale down the overall 
case mortality rate of  Tuberculosis which currently stands at 
24% in health care workers against the general population.6
Therefore, it is imperative to use a conventional checklist 
devised by the World Health Organisation (WHO) which is 
called ‘World Health Organisation / African Region Office 
International Systems Organisation 15189 accreditation 
checklist’, in short the WHO / AFRO ISO 15189 accreditation 
checklist. It contains items and protocols that are supposed 
to be available in the laboratory in order to recognize it and 
be allowed to participate in international laboratory quality 
schemes. And since most African countries have limited 
resources, the WHO recommends an aggregate score of  
80% or above to be considered for accreditation.7 In 1995, 
Sewell D, conducted a study in the United States of  America 
to identify laboratory-associated infections and bio safety. It 
was reported that the risk of  exposure to infectious agents 
tends to be lower in laboratory workers than other groups 
of  health care workers (HCW) but the risk of  laboratory-
associated infection in employees of  clinical and research 
laboratories is greater than in the general population.8
This study was aimed at assessing the safety for the laboratory 
workers in TB microscopy centers in Blantyre urban.
Methodology
All primary TB microscopy centres in Blantyre urban 
(Lirangwe, Chilomoni, South Lunzu, Ndirande, Limbe, 
Zingwangwa, Mpemba, Chileka and Bangwe Health centres) 
that perform TB microscopy were included in the study. All 
referral, private and research laboratories were excluded.
Two methods were employed to collect data in this study. 
The ‘observational method’ and a ‘Checklist’ were used 
to assess the availability and utilization of  safety facilities 
especially to find out the necessary Personal Protective 
Equipment available (PPE) and how the available PPE were 
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used. On observational data collection, visual comparison 
of  the TB microscopy centre was done by the investigators. 
Information such as, if  the TB laboratory was isolated, if  
entry to the laboratory was restricted, laboratory air flow, and 
how PPE were used was collected through observation. A 
Checklist contained some recommendations from the WHO 
and investigators used such information to compare the 
available PPE and other safety measures at each facility.
All TB microscopy centers were evaluated using WHO / 
AFRO ISO 15189 accreditation checklist. It was standardized 
to meet the objectives of  the project. The elements of  this 
checklist are based on ISO standard 15189:2007(E) and, to a 
lesser extent, CLSI guideline GP26-A37.
A score of  2 points was awarded for each item available; 1 
point for unsatisfactory outcome and no (0) point when the 
item was not available or the procedure was not followed 
as shown on supplementary data. Procedures which were 
assessed comprised sputum reception, transportation, smear 
preparation and slide staining.
The checklist was divided into sections; Reagents and 
Consumables which had a possible total score of  34; Items 
and Design had a total possible score of  78 and Procedures 
(sputum reception, transportation, smear preparation and 
slide staining) which had a possible total score of  40.
The aggregate score for all the sections was 152. Therefore 
each microscopy center was calculated a percentage from the 
aggregate score and ranked according to the corresponding 
star level indicated on table 1.













The specific safety aspect such as the general work practice, 
the suitability of  the facility to perform TB microscopy and 
finally the status of  the laboratory equipment for each health 
centre were also assessed.
Results
The findings revealed that eight of  the nine TB microscopy 
centres lacked proper safety facilities as indicated in Table 2
Table 2: Results for all Blantyre urban health centers following WHO/
AFRO grading system
Summary of the findings for all the TB microscopy centres in Blantyre 
Urban. source: J.Majamanda, P.Ndhlovu and I.T. Shawa
Since the first objective involved taking note of  the items 
and protocols at the site, the specific observations which 
directly contributed the star level of  each health centre are 
given in much detail below:
Ndirande Health Centre had a dysfunctional biosafety 
cabinet fan. When in use it was incapable of  sucking air out 
of  the safety cabinet but rather pushed the air towards the 
worker. The exhaust duct was blocked by the iron sheets. 
There were no biohazard bags, which made the disposition 
of  laboratory wastes risky. There were no ideal sputum 
transportation boxes; as such the cartons were improvised, 
as shown in the figures 1 below; 
Figure 1: Improvised transportation boxes
Chileka Health Centre had no disinfectants. The already 
prepared reagents were not properly labeled. And the 
biosafety cabinet was not working properly.
Mpemba Health centre had no sample reception area. The 
centre did not have biohazard bags, and equipment for 
preparing reagents for smear preparations.
At South Lunzu health centre, the biosafety cabinet was not 
available; as such TB smear preparation was done on open 
benches. There was no ideal sample transportation box; 
therefore a carton was also improvised just like Ndirande 
health centre. There were no disinfectants and hand washing 
soaps. Patients were seen carrying their own sputum samples 
into the laboratory, passing through a crowd of  other 
waiting patients, exposing not only the laboratory workers to 
potential TB infection, but also the other patients.
Limbe Health Centre did not have sample transportation 
boxes; as such cartons were also improvised. The biosafety 
cabinet exhaust duct faced the patients’ waiting area as 
shown in figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Improperly placed exhaust ducts at Limbe Health Centre.
At Lirangwe Health Centre, there was no electricity 
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connection, no reagent preparation materials such as weighing 
balance, staining racks and proper glassware. However this 
health center had a proper sputum transportation box as 
recommended by the Ministry of  Health as shown in the 
figure 3 below;
Figure 3: An ideal sputum transportation box at Lirangwe Health 
Centre
At Zingwangwa Health Centre there were no biohazard 
bags. The direction of  air in the biosafety was from dirty to 
clean area. There were no biohazard bags and some staining 
reagents such as phenol solution.
Bangwe Health Centre had no biohazard bags. Exhaust ducts 
placed close to open windows.
In the absence of  a designated sample reception area at 
Chilomoni Health Centre, patients brought their own sputum 
samples to the laboratory, passing through a crowded waiting 
area. No soap for disinfection was seen. The samples were 
processed in a tiny and congested (not spacious) laboratory 
room.
The three aspects of  safety (work practice, facility layout, 
and equipment) for all the health centers revealed that all the 
aspects of  safety in the laboratory were affected, but facility 
layout was affected the most. Figure 4 shows how each health 
centre performed. For example, the study shows that safety 
related to work practice at Zingwangwa health centre was 
above 80% which means that the laboratory personnel are 
striving to ensure safety in the laboratory. The infrastructure 
at the centre was rated at 80% to provide safety in the 
laboratory while status of  the laboratory equipment was 
60% which calls for some improvements.
Safety aspects such as work practice, infrastructure and status 
of  laboratory equipment: source J.Majamanda, P.Ndhlovu 
and I.T. Shawa
Figure 4: The Bar graph showing specific safety aspect for each health 
centre
The mean score for all the 9 centers is 66.67% which is far 
too low from the minimum requirement of  80%. Eight (8) 
out of  the nine (9) centres in the study population have 
scored less than the minimum safety requirement of  ≥80% 
which represent 89% unsafe centres.
Discussion
This cross-sectional facility based analytical survey was 
designed to assess the safety in primary Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis smear microscopy centres in Blantyre urban. 
The minimum safety requirement as established by the 
WHO/AFRO for each primary microscopy centre is ≥80% 
using the ISO 15189 standardised checklist for developing 
countries. The findings of  this study show that only one 
microscopy centre (Zingwangwa) out of  nine centres scored 
80%, which is the minimum safety requirement while the rest 
of  the health centres were below the required minimum set 
standards. All the aspects that offer safety in the laboratory 
(facility layout, equipment and work practice) have been 
affected, but the most affected is the facility layout. This 
does not only put the laboratory workers at risk of  infection, 
but also the patients and any other person accessing the 
laboratory services.
The findings correlate with another study conducted in Malawi 
in 1998 by Nyirenda TE, which concluded that laboratory 
conditions and safety procedures in TB smear microscopy 
in Malawi are poor3. The health centres provide easy access 
for TB testing and assist in early detection of  smear positive 
cases which enhance the prompt treatment and management 
of  patients. From the findings, Zingwangwa health centre 
would be considered safe (borderline) to perform smear 
microscopy according to the used guidelines. There is need 
to ensure safety in all the laboratory facilities where TB 
smear microscopy is performed. The study indicated that the 
health centres lack proper infrastructure. The laboratories 
were too small and crowded.
Conclusion	And	Recommendations
In Blantyre urban, 89% of  the Tuberculosis microscopy 
centres were failing to provide the minimum safety to the 
laboratory workers. All the microscopy centres except one 
(11%) that were included in the sample frame had scored less 
than the minimum safety requirement (80%). This means 
that 89% of  the microscopy centres in Blantyre urban failed 
to provide the minimum safety to the laboratory workers. 
Government and other stake holders should therefore be 
committed in providing safety in the laboratories in the 
country (in primary Tb microscopy centres and other referral 
centres which face the same challenges).
It is recommended that the study be conducted at the 
regional or national level in order to have a general picture of  
safety in Tb microscopy centres possibly across the country. 
Both public and private laboratories should be included in 
future studies.
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